Reflections on Salary Shares and Salary Caps by Zimbalist, Andrew
Smith ScholarWorks 
Economics: Faculty Publications Economics 
2-1-2010 
Reflections on Salary Shares and Salary Caps 
Andrew Zimbalist 
Smith College, azimbali@smith.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zimbalist, Andrew, "Reflections on Salary Shares and Salary Caps" (2010). Economics: Faculty 
Publications, Smith College, Northampton, MA. 
https://scholarworks.smith.edu/eco_facpubs/45 
This Article has been accepted for inclusion in Economics: Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of 
Smith ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@smith.edu 
Reflections on Salary
Shares and Salary Caps
Andrew Zimbalist1
Abstract
This article takes a closer look at salary and revenue figures for the four major
professional sports in the United States. It shows that the reporting typically
offered in the popular media and often picked up in academic work can be rather
misleading. The article first considers the conundrums in defining player
compensation and then those connected to revenue. On the basis of adjusted
data, the article proceeds to look at salary shares in revenue across the four
leagues and considers the irony that the salary share in Major League Baseball
(MLB) appears to be lower than the three leagues with a salary cap, the National
Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), and National
Hockey League (NHL). It concludes with some analysis of the impact of salary
caps and other mechanisms on controlling player costs.
Keywords
league revenue, player compensation, salary caps, measurement issues
Introduction
Writing for Yahoo! Sports on November 12, 2007, Jeff Passan asserted that the
players’ salary share of Major League Baseball (MLB) revenue in 2007 was only
41.3%.1 Passan’s number was then picked up by Pete Toms writing for Baseball
Digest and other journalists.2 Were Passan correct, or even nearly so, then it would
be big news indeed. Because the salary shares in total revenue (TR) in the National
Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL), and National
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Hockey League (NHL) are all in the mid- to high-50s and MLB is the only one of the
four major professional sports in the United States, without a salary cap, it might
suggest to some that Don Fehr and the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA) have been fighting the wrong fight all these years. Passan’s assertion,
then, is another reminder that, whether we are theorizing about optimal labor market
structures or doing empirical testing, it makes to get the numbers right before
plowing ahead.
Accordingly, in this article, I will discuss many of the empirical issues involved
in properly measuring the players’ shares in MLB, along with the NBA, NFL, and
NHL. I will then suggest a preliminary set of conclusions on these shares and
conclude with some reflections on what these shares imply about the underlying col-
lective bargaining institutions. Special knowledge of the real world, even though it
may sometimes be proprietary or may entail diligent digging, can help sharpen and
deepen research by sports economists and, thereby, make it more relevant to policy
makers in the sports industry as well as in government.
Getting the Numbers Right
Team payrolls can be measured in a variety of ways. First, they can include only the
active roster, the active roster plus the disabled list players, or the active roster,
disabled list, plus the reserves. The league with the largest ‘‘reserves’’ list is MLB,
where there are 15 players under major league contracts, who are not on the 25-man
active roster. Second, they can include or exclude player benefits, usually amounting
to between 4% and 7% of salaries. Third, they can include or exclude deferred sal-
aries. If they include them, there is a question about what discount rate to use.
Fourth, they can be based on opening day, mid-season or end-season rosters.3
Fifth, player contracts have varying lengths. In the MLB, there is no limit on the
length of a contract and some players receive guaranteed deals for as long as 10
years. In the NBA, player contracts are limited to 5 years for non-Bird free agents
and to 6 years for Bird free agents. In the NFL, contract length is not limited, but,
with few exceptions, players sign nonguaranteed contracts. The contracts may be
multiyear, but because they are not guaranteed, the team can terminate the contract
after any year. In lieu of guaranteed contracts, a large share of players’ compensation
is paid via substantial signing bonuses. These bonuses account for roughly 50% of
total NFL player compensation in any given year. Normally, these bonuses are amor-
tized over the nominal length of the contract in computing annual team payrolls.
Here, too, the discount rate employed will affect valuation and the nominal contract
length is a rather artificial standard to apply because it is rarely realized.
Sixth, in MLB, teams spend $20.6 million on average on player development; of
this, approximately $11.8 million on average goes to minor league player compen-
sation.4 In the NHL, teams typically spend $1 million to $2 million annually on their
minor league team salaries, but they also frequently own this team and therefore own
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the revenues the team generates; this is true for only a minority of MLB teams. In the
NBA, there is a very modest outlay for the Development League and here too
revenues go to the NBA owners. In the NFL, there is no payment for minor league
players.
Thus, when comparing player shares at the top level, it is relevant to consider the
substantial additional expenditure on player compensation in MLB due to the
structure of its extensive minor league system. To a lesser extent, this is true for
the NHL. To be sure, it is important to use a uniform accounting system across the
leagues for all these issues in measuring player compensation.
Revenue data, like payroll data, come in different shapes and sizes. One only has
to read the definition of revenues in the three salary cap leagues to be convinced of
this. In the NFL, NBA, and NHL, the salary cap is defined as a share of defined
revenues. Thus, the definition of revenues is an integral part of the payroll determi-
nation process and, hence, it is a subject of intense negotiations during collective
bargaining. The NFL and NBA have changed the definition of revenues with each
new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) because the union has sought a more
inclusive definition and because new revenue sources have become available over
time.5
Here are some examples of the conundrums that must be sorted out. When a team
owner also owns another business that trades with the team, the owner can arrange
for that trade to occur at any price. This is known as a related party transaction. In a
salary cap league or a league with revenue sharing (e.g., baseball), there is a strong
incentive for the owner to price the trade in a way that minimizes team revenue or
profit and maximizes the revenue or profit of the related entity. The CBA must sort
out a way to treat such transactions. The NBA CBA, for instance, has a clause that
states that the Knicks deal with Madison Square Garden (MSG) network (both com-
panies are owned by Cablevision) must be valued at the price that the Los Angeles
Lakers receive from the team’s local television (TV) rights holder.
The NFL introduced its G3 program in the late 1990s to help teams with the
private financing component of building new stadiums. In essence, the league makes
a grant6 between $60 million and $150 million to the team, depending on the size of
the team’s capital contribution to construction and on the size of the team’s market.
The National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) agreed that because
new stadiums helped grow league revenues and, thus, help to increase salaries, that
the union would support the G3 program by allowing a cap credit in proportion to the
size of the private contribution to stadium renovation or construction.7 The upshot
was that this credit was the equivalent of a leaguewide revenue reduction of tens
of millions of dollars annually.8 With the new CBA, which took effect in 2006, the
adjustments for G3 loans and security expenditures are still more complex.9 There
are further complications because NFL stadiums are invariably used for other events,
for example, college football, concerts, mass rallies, and so on. Because the union
does not want to contribute to raising the team owners’ revenues from events that
do not enter the computation of football-related revenues, involved formulas must
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be devised to parse revenues from nonfootball events and to adjust the allowed
deductions from cap-based revenues.
A similar problem emerges when an arena hosts multiple types of events during
the year. It could be that the NBA and NHL teams play in the same arena, which
might also host the Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA), the circus,
the rodeo, concerts, and more. In such a case, how is the NBA or the NHL to deter-
mine which proportion of permanent signage or year-long suite revenue is attributa-
ble to each category of event?
The leagues and unions bargain over these and other arcane issues, and the result
is long, complex sections in each league’s CBA to set rules for defining revenue. The
2005 NBA CBA, for instance, contains 25 pages dedicated to defining basketball-
related income (BRI), the base on which the salary cap, the escrow threshold, and
the luxury tax are defined.
Although there is no salary cap in baseball, the revenue definition issue is still
hotly contested for several reasons. Chief among them is that MLB introduced a rev-
enue sharing system among the teams back in 1996, that has grown considerably
over the past 13 years. In 2008, approximately $400 million was transferred from
the high- to the low-revenue teams. The higher a team’s revenue, the more it has
to contribute. The lower the revenue, the more it receives. The principal terrain of
disputation is related party transactions, where team owners also own the regional
sports network (RSN) that broadcasts the teams’ games. It appears that several teams
underreport the market value of the RSN revenue received by tens of millions of
dollars and, in one case at least, this underreporting appears to exceed $100 million
by a substantial margin.
As mentioned above, the NFL, NBA, and NHL each have concepts of sport-
related revenues that are intended to be inclusive. Yet, the specifics of the definitions
of league revenues, as defined in each league’s CBA, still vary. Here are some of the
ways the definitions differ. Regarding gate revenue, the NHL’s hockey-related
revenues (HRR) include revenue that would be generated by complimentary tickets
if they were sold, while the NBA’s BRI allows for the exclusion of 1.35 million
complimentary tickets. The NFL’s TR excludes the value of tickets exchanged in
barter transactions, while BRI and HRR include them.
Regarding media revenues, the leagues have different conventions for deducting
the value of advertising spots used to promote the league. Regarding sponsorship
and sponsorship revenues, HRR includes 100% of facility naming rights revenues,
while BRI includes 45–50% of such revenues. BRI includes 40% of fixed signage
revenue, while HRR includes 65% (or 32.5% for two-team arenas). Regarding
premium seating, TR includes all luxury suite revenues net of direct expenses, while
BRI includes only 40% and HRR includes 65% (32.5% for two-team arenas).
Regarding related party transactions, HRR is less inclusive than BRI.
The foregoing should serve as a caution flag about the nuances in the ways different
leagues define salary and revenue. Certainly, the nature of these differences needs to
be understood before meaningful salary and revenue comparisons can be made.
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A Preliminary Look at the Evidence
With the above caveats in mind, we can proceed cautiously to review some of the avail-
able evidence on salary shares in the top four team sports leagues in the United States.
The foregoing numbers from the NFL are based on total player compensation,
measured on a cash, end-of-season basis, and including benefits. The player shares
are given both in relation to defined gross revenues (DGRs) and TRs, as defined in
the CBAs.10 Up until 2006, the NFL salary cap was calculated as a share of DGR, but
DGR came to include a larger and larger share of football’s TRs. In the agreement
that commenced in 2006, it was decided to use TR as the base for the salary cap
calculation, but to lower the nominal cap percentage from 65.5% of DGR in 2005
to 57% of TR in 2006. As a result, the salary and benefit share of TR jumped from
54.3% in 2005 to 58.4% in 2006.11
Two interesting points about this jump need to be made. First, although the share
jumped appreciably in 1 year, the share in 2006 was less than 1 percentage point higher
than it was in 2004, and it was below the average share of 59.55% during the entire
period from 1994 to 2006. Second, the 2006 agreement added a cap adjustment mech-
anism (CAM), which made it more difficult for clubs to regularly use signing bonuses as
a means to go over the official cap. In other words, it tightened the cap (Table 1).
Table 2 below reports the trend in player shares for the NBA since 1995. These
data are reported as a share of BRI. As discussed earlier, BRI is more inclusive than
DGR, and almost as inclusive as TR. Salary represents cash payouts and includes
benefits. As depicted, the players’ share rose between 1995-1996 and 2000-2001
but then fell. With the escrow system and luxury tax to supplement the basic
NBA team cap, the salary share has remained steady at 57% since the 2001-2002 sea-
son. Although precise calculations are not available, it appears that the players’ share
in total basketball revenue, as opposed to BRI, would be between 55% and 56%.
Reliable data for the players’ share in NHL revenues are not available over a mul-
tiyear period. However, the 2005 CBA clearly stipulates a mechanism to maintain
the players’ share in the 54–57% (of HRR) range. The NHL has an escrow system
that ensures the player share will remain within the set parameters.
Interestingly, the players’ share rises as hockey revenues increase: players are to
receive 54% of league revenues (including benefits) when league revenues are
below $2.2 billion; 55% when between $2.2 billion and $2.4 billion; 56% when
between $2.4 billion and $2.7 billion; and 57% when more than $2.7 billion.12 The
following hypothetical illustration makes clear why it is sensible for the players’
share to rise as revenues increase.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Growth Rate
Revenues $70 million $77 million $84.7 million $93.2 million 10%
Payroll (54%) $37.8 million $41.6 million $45.8 million $50.3 million 10%
Other costs $30 million $30.9 million $31.8 million $32.8 million 3%
Profits $2.2 million $4.5 million $7.1 million $10.1 million 66.2%
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If league revenues increase at a faster rate than the economywide inflation rate
and if player salary growth follows revenue growth, then the pattern of outcome will
resemble that shown in the table above. Because overall revenues and player com-
pensation have grown at the same rate, but the remaining roughly 55% of costs aug-
ment only at the national inflation rate, the profitability necessarily has to grow and
it may do so very rapidly.
A similar pattern holds when comparing salary shares across leagues. Because
teams in MLB, the NFL, NBA, and NHL all have certain basic costs, such as front
office, facility rental and/or maintenance, team travel, promotion, ticketing, and so
on, the share of TRs represented by these costs shrinks as revenues rise. Other things
equal, this leaves more room for profit, at any given player compensation share, in
those leagues with higher revenues.13
As depicted in Table 3, the player salary share of TRs in MLB displays more
volatility than the other U.S. team sports; understandably so, because MLB is the
only U.S. league without a salary cap.
The player compensation figures in Table 3 include benefits and bonuses for all
players on the 40-man major league roster.14 The revenue data include only the rev-
enue emanating from baseball-related activities. Thus, for example, if Major League
Baseball Advanced Media (MLBAM; MLB’s Internet business) earns revenue from
selling tickets to nonbaseball events, this revenue would not be included above.
Table 1. NFL Salary Shares, 1994-2006
League Year
Player Compensation
as % of Total Revenue
Player Compensation
as % of DGR TR/DGR
1994 62.10% 69.40% 1.118
1995 64.70% 73.10% 1.130
1996 65.00% 74.00% 1.138
1997 57.60% 66.20% 1.149
1998 61.40% 69.00% 1.124
1999 63.00% 71.30% 1.132
2000 62.60% 70.80% 1.131
2001 56.90% 64.40% 1.132
2002 56.10% 63.60% 1.134
2003 54.50% 62.00% 1.138
2004 57.50% 65.70% 1.143
2005 54.30% 62.30% 1.147
2006 58.40% N/A
Average 59.55% 67.65% 1.136
Average 2003-2006 56.18% 63.33%
Average 2000-2006 57.19% 64.80%
Average 1994-2006 59.55% 67.65%
Note: DGR ¼ defined gross revenues; NFL ¼ National Football League; TR ¼ total revenue.
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Overall revenues generated by MLB-connected businesses exceeded $6 billion in
2007; of this, approximately $5.7 billion came from MLB activities.
The player share reached a peak of 67% of revenues in 2002, but since has fallen
to 51%. This decrease is a function of new provisions in the 2002 CBA (sharply
increased revenue sharing with high marginal tax rates, a higher luxury tax on the
top payrolls, and debt limitation rules) as well as the rapid growth in MLB revenues
over this period (causing the players to play catch up) and more stringent player dis-
ability insurance rules with higher premiums.
Before comparing MLB’s apparently low 51% with the 55% of HRR in hockey,
the 57% of BRI in basketball or the 58.4% of TR in football, it is necessary to make
at least one important adjustment. MLB teams have to cover very substantial minor
league player costs, whereas the NBA (National Basketball Development League
[NBDL]) and the NHL (American Hockey League [AHL] and a few players in the
East Coast Hockey League [ECHL]) have modest minor league player costs, and
the NFL has none. The NBDL and AHL also generate revenues that help to defray
the player costs. The minor league MLB teams are mostly independently owned and,
in any case, the revenues earned do not go to the major league team, yet the major
league team pays the salaries of all the players on affiliated clubs.
In 2007, the average MLB team spent more than $20 million on its player devel-
opment system. Of this, more than $11.5 million went to pay the salaries of the
minor league players. Generally, each MLB team has six minor league affiliates.
Teams also run fall and winter development camps and leagues. Together, an aver-
age of 6.2% of MLB revenues went toward these minor league salaries.
Table 2. NBA Salary Shares, 1995-1996–2006-2007
















Note: BRI ¼ basketball related income; NBA ¼ National Basketball Association.
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If we add the 6.2% that goes to minor league baseball players (without generating
revenue for the major league club), the total player share in MLB revenue rises to
57.2%, putting it ahead of the NBA and NHL shares. Other special features of the
baseball labor market reinforce the downward pressure on annual player salaries.
First, baseball does not have statutory limits on the length of player contracts. Alex
Rodriguez just signed a 10-year contract worth between $275 and $300 million. If
MLB had a rule, as does the NBA, limiting A-Rod’s contract to 6 years, how much
would he have been paid on an annual basis? Competitive forces would have led to
something considerably higher than $28 or $29 million a year, and MLB’s salary
share would be higher.
Second, some of the money that teams pay out for players in MLB does not go to
the players; rather, it goes to Japanese companies, thanks to the idiosyncrasies of
baseball’s posting system. Thus, the Red Sox paid $101 million for Matsuzaka, but
only $50 million of this went to Matsuzaka and the Yankees paid $46 million for
Igawa, but only $20 million was part of the players’ salary share.
That said, MLB has higher TRs than hockey or basketball and we would expect
its player compensation share to be higher. The MLB adjusted share of 57.4% during
Table 3. Major League Baseball (MLB) Salary—Revenue Data: 1990-2007 (thousands of
dollars)
Year Total Player Compensation Total Revenue Ratio
1990 532,740 1,277,399 42%
1991 681,488 1,456,217 47%
1992 906,420 1,669,878 54%
1993 1,007,887 1,862,682 54%
1994a 758,536 1,209,286 63%
1995a 864,783 1,384,990 62%
1996 1,036,930 1,775,170 58%
1997 1,213,741 2,067,220 59%
1998 1,383,764 2,478,850 56%
1999 1,618,518 2,761,060 59%
2000 1,878,436 3,324,828 56%
2001 2,149,660 3,536,546 61%
2002 2,298,347 3,432,156 67%
2003 2,355,663 3,728,096 63%
2004 2,341,007 4,257,770 55%
2005 2,493,938 4,743,972 53%
2006 2,636,186 5,205,535 51%




a Shortened seasons due to players’ strike.
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2006 and 2007 is basically at the same level as the NBA share. Because some NHL
teams do not own their AHL affiliates (and do not reap revenue from the club’s
activities, but nonetheless cover compensation for the team’s players), some of their
minor league costs should also be added to its player share. After this adjustment, the
NHL player share appears also to be around 58%. Thus, the recent MLB adjusted
share is very similar to the adjusted shares in the NBA and the NHL, but, given the
higher revenues in MLB, one would expect its share to be above those leagues.
Discussion
The abiding question is why, given the presence of a salary cap system in the NBA,
NHL, and NFL and the absence of a cap in MLB, MLB players do not command a
higher share of sport revenues. The MLBPA has made a religion of avoiding a salary
cap system at all costs and, as a result of this orthodoxy, has endured multiple work
stoppages over the years. Has the fight been in vain?
Unfortunately, there are no definitive answers to that question, but the very fact
that the question can be asked is of profound interest. After all, if cap and open sys-
tems are salary share neutral, but cap systems, as economic theory instructs us under
most assumptions, are more likely to promote competitive balance, then cap systems
would appear to be a preferred mechanism for optimizing league performance.
The tensions experienced in the NFL since the 2006 move to using TR as the cap
base, however, suggest a possible disadvantage to a cap system. Namely, in the pres-
ence of unequal club revenues, if all teams are compelled to have payrolls within a
certain narrow range, and such range is determined based on leaguewide revenues,
then markedly unequal rates of profit across the clubs may result. Minimally, this
outcome produces tension and conflict among the team owners and, maximally, it
could challenge financial stability across the league.
In this way, the more open system of MLB may be preferable. As stated above,
MLB has noncap mechanisms that appear to be very effective at controlling team
payrolls. When MLB introduced its more extensive and mature system of revenue
sharing in the 2002 CBA, the owners offered the players association the option of
setting a minimum team payroll at $40 million. The players association rejected this
offer for three reasons (a) the MLBPA has always maintained that it was in favor of
free labor market and having a payroll floor would be inconsistent with this position;
(b) the MLBPA saw the floor as a prelude to a ceiling, which they wanted to avoid;
and, (c) back in 2002, the lowest team payroll was close to $40 million anyway and
the MLBPA expected all teams to naturally rise above this threshold.
The owners’ thought behind the minimum payroll was that some teams would be
receiving revenue transfers upward of $30 million annually in the name of promot-
ing competitive balance. If the transfers were indeed to level the playing field, then
the recipient clubs should use their transfers on improving their rosters. The mini-
mum payroll would support this goal.
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What was perhaps not anticipated by the MLBPA is that the introduction of the
revenue-sharing welfare system in baseball would create a new model for success of
low-revenue franchises. Basically, if a team received $30 million in sharing transfers
and another $30 million from the central fund (from national and international
media, sponsorship, and licensing revenues), then by lowballing payroll, such a team
could almost guarantee itself an operating profit at season’s end. Indeed, several
teams apparently adopted this strategy and lowered payroll into the $14–$30 million
range over the ensuing years. The good news was that this option preserved the prof-
itability and financial strength of low-revenue clubs, the bad news is that it did little
to provide ownership incentive to produce a winning team or to promote the desider-
atum of competitive balance.
One of the strongest claims in favor of more open labor markets is that they are
the mechanism by which higher team revenues lead to higher player salaries. That is,
under competitive conditions, a team will find itself pushed to offer a player a salary
equal to his expected marginal revenue product.15 So, as revenues rise, so will sal-
aries. This argument is sound but requires two caveats.
First, a salary cap mechanism can accomplish the same result, as salaries are
defined explicitly as a share of revenues. Indeed, in the NHL cap system, the salary
share increases as revenues grow. Nonetheless, the issue remains under a cap system,
whether all the appropriate revenues are being reported accurately. If, for instance,
some related party revenues are being underreported, then a cap system potentially
will not capture a fair share for the players. In contrast, an open system is more likely
to capture such revenues, because teams with auxiliary revenue streams will take
these into account as they bid for players in the open market. This point segues
directly to the next caveat.
Second, the presence of substantial related party revenues lends greater attrac-
tiveness to a cap system. This is because related party revenues are another source
(in addition to, e.g., market size or facility characteristics) of major revenue
differentials among the clubs. To the extent that some clubs may be receiving
$100 million or more annually in related party revenues, the ability of such clubs
to outbid their competitors for the best free agents and to raise the price on other
players beyond the means of clubs without related party revenues is heightened,
and the issues of competitive imbalance and financial fragility become more press-
ing. Under such circumstances, the desirability of a cap system may become
greater. Of course, as indicated above, salary caps have come with salary floors,
and minimum payrolls require a certain degree of revenue balance across teams
to be viable.
The foregoing is a general consideration of some of the extant structural issues
confronting the management of sports leagues. The purpose of these reflections has
not been to resolve the issues, but, rather, to point out the need for empirical rigor in
defining the dimensions of the problem and for more nuanced analysis of the
complex forces at play.
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Notes
1. Jeff Passan, ‘‘Comfortably Numb: Free Agents Paydays Should Grow,’’ Yahoo! Sports,
November 12, 2007.
2. See, for instance, Pete Toms, ‘‘Beyond the Diamond,’’ Baseball Digest, March 18, 2008,
and Liz Mullen, ‘‘Flood of Talent Keeps Salaries in Check,’’ Sports Business Journal,
March 17, 2008.
3. It is particularly important to pay attention to this distinction when looking at the relation-
ship between payroll and performance. Teams in the playoff hunt frequently add to their
payroll toward the end of the season, while teams out of the hunt unload players. This
raises the payroll of successful teams (and vice versa), increasingly the correlation between
payroll and performance, but in this case it is the performance that causes payroll rather
than the other way around.
4. The $11.8 million does not include compensation to the players on the 40-man major
league roster.
5. The National Basketball Association (NBA) switched from defined gross revenues (DGR),
basically media plus gate revenues, to basketball-related income (BRI), including various
categories of arena revenues, in 1999. In the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), they kept the BRI term, but broadened the concept further to make it somewhat
more inclusive. The National Football League (NFL) introduced its DGR with its salary
cap in 1993. In that concept, a distinction was drawn between revenues supposedly directly
generated by the players (media and gate), called DGR, and revenues not directly gener-
ated by the players, excluded defined gross revenues (EDGR). However, the 1993 CBA
also stipulated that if the ratio of EDGR/DGR increased beyond its 1993 level, that any
overage (known as spillover) would be added into the revenue base for calculating the sal-
ary cap. Spillover did grow over time, until the NFL and the National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA) decided to shift to the TR concept in 2006, which nominally
includes all football-related revenues. When they made this switch, the league also lowered
the designated percentage going to the players from 65.5% to 57%.
6. The G3 contribution is referred to as a loan, but it is paid back with funds (34% of club seat
revenue) that the team would transfer to the league in any event. So, it is more accurately
described as a grant.
7. The actual computation of the credit is convoluted in the extreme. Fifty percent of up to a
maximum of $300 million per project in present value terms would be allocated for more
than 15 years, or a maximum of $20 million per year per project. On a per team basis, this
amounts to a $625,000 cap credit on each team’s salary cap per project. Thus, in 2005, for
instance, with the player share being 65.5% of DGR, this was the equivalent of a downward
revenue adjustment of just more than $954,000 per team, or $30.5 million leaguewide.
8. See previous footnote.
9. In 2007, for instance, the salary cap was set by taking 57% of ‘‘TR,’’ subtracting benefits,
and dividing by 32, to get the per team cap. Within this 57%, there is assumed to be a credit
of 1.8% to cover the former G3 and security credit. If the G3 and security credit exceeds
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1.8%, then the league is entitled to an additional credit up to 2.3%. Expenditures on G3
and security in excess of 2.3% can only be credited by decision of an arbitrator.
10. The source of this table is author’s communication with the NFL. As indicated in the
table, TR exceeds DGR by between 11.8% and 14.7%, depending on the year.
11. As I write in mid-April 2008, the 2007 share has not yet been officially tabulated, but the
author was told by a league executive that the share should come in very close to the 2006
share.
12. For the 2008-2009 season, the players’ share of hockey-related revenues (HRR) is pro-
jected to increase to 56%, or roughly $56.3 million per team, with a team payroll floor
of $40 million.
13. Ironically, the NFL displays a contrary pattern. One exception to the general pattern is the
rapidly escalating cost of building stadiums and arenas. Insofar as new facility construc-
tion is funded by the team or the league (as in the NFL’s G3 program), then the tendency
for rising salary shares to follow rising revenues may be attenuated or reversed.
14. For most MLB teams, the 40-man roster payroll is usually only $1 million or $2 million
above the payroll for the active 25-man roster.
15. Or, to the extent it is known, one dollar more than the player’s MRP to the club with the
next highest MRP for the player.
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